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Abstract
This paper investigates how the Court’s organisation affect judg-
ments. We use a historical accident to derive this impact. Indeed,
though the same bankruptcy laws apply on the whole territory, courts
in the eastern part of France (in Alsace-Moselle) consist on a mix of
professional and non-professional judges, while other French Courts
are only composed of lay judges. Using an original dataset of firms
with monthly bankruptcy ratings, we analyse the decision to file for
bankruptcy. To do so we restrict our sample to firms inside and outside
but close to Alsace-Moselle. We study their survival after their rating
has dropped between two months. We find mixed Courts in Alsace-
Moselle have lower rates of bankruptcy which should be explained by
a lower reorganisation rate. We could think that mixed courts are less
efficient ex-ante compared to lay courts. Yet both have overall similar
level of liquidation rate. Thus, both systems provide similar ex-post
efficiency while behaving differently.
1 Introduction
In most countries, bankruptcy is judged by common law courts. Only few
countries including the USA or France have a specialised jurisdiction to judge
bankruptcy. France is also unique with most of its bankruptcy judges being
elected among businessmen. Since 1563, French bankruptcy judges have
been lay judges1, called consular judges, elected among businessmen in each
jurisdiction2. Thanks to an historical accident, France has another judicial
1Lay judges are appointed volunteers with no required legal instruction by opposition
to career judges, also called professional judges
2Henceforth, we will call this type of court “lay court”.
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organisation in some areas. Bankruptcy courts in the Eastern part of France
(Alsace-Moselle) have a unique organisation. They are ruled by a professional
judge, helped by two consular judges3. This organization is called échevinage
and exists in a few European countries including Belgium or Germany.
Bankruptcy literature not only compares legal traditions4, it also matches
specific bankruptcy reforms to legal environments, in particular the judicial
organisation (for example bankruptcy law depending on the ability of judges,
and the quality of contract enforcement in Ayotte and Yun (2004)). The
French situation can provide insights on how differences in organisation can
lead to differences in judging bankruptcy within similar legal and economic
framework. France has a unique setting where we can compare two original
types of courts, mixed versus lay courts as opposed to the most common
courts with career judges. We first want to derive differences in filing for
bankruptcy from the comparison between mixed-courts vs. lay courts. It
is the first study, to the best of our knowledge which examines differences
in bankruptcy policy because of court’s organisations. As mentioned by
Hans, 2003, there is limited work on lay person’s impact in legal decision
making, except in criminal juries ; and the participation of laypersons to
courts is increasingly put into question.5 We also want to understand how
this organization may affect court’s efficient screening between non-viable
and viable firms that should be reorganised through bankruptcy.
This study derives from the legal realism literature. Courts cannot be
considered as black boxes. Conversely to the famous quote of Montesquieu,
judges are far from being “a mouth that says the law” and “inanimate beings”
(Montesquieu, 1748). Their decisions should provide help to make the law
evolve by setting precedents. They are also affected by biases just as lay per-
sons. Their judgments can be influenced by work conditions (see Danziger,
Levav, and Avnaim-Pesso, 2011); their environment such as political pres-
sure (Lambert-Mogiliansky, Sonin, and Zhuravskaya, 2007) or economic con-
ditions (Ichino, Polo, and Rettore, 2003; Marinescu, 2011; Esquerre, 2014),
but also because of political beliefs, with contrasted evidence (nearly none
in Ashenfelter, Eisenberg, and Schwab, 1995 ; while some evidence is found
3We will call this type of court “mixed court”.
4Such question was raised but World Bank economist see for example La Porta et al.
(1996) and Silanes, La Porta, and Schleifer (2008)
5As one can see in France with the experiment of departmental criminal court to
promote alternatives to jury with the 2019 Planning Act for Justice.
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in Lazega and Mounier, 2009 for example).
These results have lead some authors to question the need for judges
rather than a well-refined regulation (Shleifer, 2012) which is not affected
by biases. Shleifer also argues over the judges’ legitimacy in their exper-
tise, for example when they judge business issues. Results from several
papers award shortcomings in many bankruptcy reforms to the lack of ex-
pertise from judges, for example in the Czech Republic (Johnson, 2001) or
in Lithuania (Johnson, 2002), as mentioned by Ayotte and Yun (2004). The
same drawback also explains in part the failure in the US-inspired Hungarian
bankruptcy system where the trustees in charge were given too much dis-
cretion with an inappropriate compensation scheme biasing their decisions
(Franks and Loranth, 2005).
We must stress out a possible limit in these arguments. They tend to
reduce Courts to a single judge while the interactions between judges mat-
ter. Our chapter is also interested in asking how the various sets of skills
born by lay and professional judges can differ in courts only formed by lay
judges. Lazega, Lemercier, and Mounier (2006) reports the interviews of
French judges in the Parisian Commercial court with only consular judges.
They show that a social network emerged where they share skills on specific
business issues. Other evidences of this socialisation is shown by Vidal and
Leaver (2015) in the English Court of Appeal: judges tend to quote cita-
tions from esteemed colleagues. Their citations show how their decisions are
affected by their social network.
Most importantly, this chapter is driven by the question linking court’s
organisation and efficiency of bankruptcy. Such organisation may raise eco-
nomic, financing and policy issues. As stressed by Ayotte and Yun (2004),
in an incomplete contract world, a debtor friendly bankruptcy law like the
French one needs for the judges to screen out viable firms within the bankrupt
ones. Otherwise the creditors are more at risk when lending and more prone
to credit constraint. If a lay court tends to promote reorganisation despite
lack of business opportunities or, on the contrary, if a professional judge
wishes to apply more strictly the French law to reorganise before considering
debt collection by the creditors6, then courts would tend to promote type I
error with a negative impact on the lending channel.
6The French Commercial code states that bankruptcies must first safeguard employ-
ment, then promote business viability and last ensure debt collection.
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We expect both mixed and lay courts to show different objective function.
Lay courts are composed of experts only with a high knowledge of each
business customs. They are also proud to judge with equity, that is to
interpret the law as to enforce a good decision according to them7. In 2018,
legal training became mandatory for French consular judges, it consists as 8
days as initial training, and two days as training each year8. This training
used to be optional beforehand but not mandatory.
Many legal professionals, like those of the judges trade union (Union
sociale des magistrats) have always claimed it is far from enough to learn
the law and how to judge (see Untermaier and Bonnot, 2013). It is all
the truer for small bankruptcy courts where experiences is thus limited. It
is sometimes argued that their judgment may heavily rely on all the legal
experts who work with them in courts, such as court’s clerks or the insolvency
practitioners. The other main criticism builds upon their impartiality. As
noted in a report from the Council of Europe (GRECO, 2014), consular
judges sit as benevolent judges so they keep on earning their wages from
their business, or they depend on the revenues of their own business. This
can lead to a conflict of interest. The issue was addressed in the 2016 Justice
law with a code of ethics. It is written by the National Council of Commercial
Courts, composed of consular judges and instated in 2018. The rule of ethic
is left at the discretion of the judge.
Having these drawbacks in mind, two main arguments can be assessed
regarding the generalisation of mixed-courts9: improvement of judiciary hu-
man capital; more transparency for investors, and in particular international
investors. Yet the efficiency brought by mixed courts rely on the the trust
and cooperation between professional and lay judges as shown by Machura,
2007 in its study of German administrative mixed courts. Machura, 2016
notes that professional judges have gained prestige through their legal stud-
ies, familiarity with work routines, and specialized legal knowledge. He shows
that lay judges can work well with professional judges when they are seen
as experts ; and when they have a strong sense of justice that helps them
question the decisions of professional judges. Overall success in mixed courts
depends on mutual appreciation. Peaceful collaboration is not ensured out-
7Both arguments are stressed by Lazega and Mounier, 2009 following their interviews
with Parisian consular judges.
8Decret number 2018-664, 27th July 2018.
9See namely Deffains (2010)
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side Alsace-Moselle. Échevinage is a sensitive issue for consular judges in
France judging from how the question has caused threats of strike and res-
ignation letters sent to the French minister of justice10.
Mixed and lay courts are considered meaningful by allowing citizens to
be involved(se e Hans, 2003). Rather than this policy question, we want to
tackle the economic efficiency of the court’s organisation. Bankruptcy litera-
ture distinguishes between ex-ante and ex-post efficiency. Ex-post efficiency
in bankruptcy deals with the maximisation of the value of the firm by the
court. The court must choose if it allows the firm to reorganize or, on the
contrary, to be liquidated. It is especially true in France where the court
can decide to reorganize the firm despite the creditors’ wish for liquidation11
(see Blazy and Chopard, 2012 on this liquidation bias). A bankruptcy court
makes ex-post efficient decisions if it is able to screen efficiently firms. It
should prevent type I errors (reorganization of firm that should be liqui-
dated) and type II errors (liquidation of firms that should be reorganized).
Ex-ante efficiency of bankruptcy embraces direct impact on broad eco-
nomic outcomes which concern all the firms and not only the distressed ones.
In line with our previous argument, Brown, Cookson, and Heimer (2014)
show that tribal courts in Native-American reserves are less predictable and
thus have weaker credit markets than jurisdictions with state courts. The
authors prove that this distinctive feature in courts leads to significant de-
creases in broad economic outcomes such as lower levels of per capita income.
Ponticelli (2013) looks at the efficiency in the implementation of a creditor-
friendly bankruptcy reform in Brazil. The success in its implementation
depends on the court’s efficiency proxied by its congestion. The effect does
not only concern bankrupt firms, it concerns all firms in the jurisdiction.
Most efficient jurisdictions end up with higher profitability after the reform.
We will consider in this chapter ex-ante efficiency as the incentive to file
for bankruptcy when facing financial distress. The firm can no longer resolve
its financial situation with out of court settlement. It is an important func-
tion of bankruptcy to ensure the best use and reallocation of capital rather
than its loss.Misuse of capital happens if the distressed firm would linger in
bankruptcy while it needs to be liquidated ; or because the firm missed busi-
10As threats also, see Vauchez and Willemez (2007) for more information on the failures
of both 1985 and 2001 attempts to reform the status of bankruptcy judges in France.
11It is similar to the cram-down procedure in the US Chapter 11.
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ness opportunities instead of restructuring its debts under reorganisation12.
We do not consider here ex-ante as the impact on financial relationship and
contracts design.
At last, our chapter builds upon a policy debate that has been well-worn
in France since 1981. Should we leave merchants’ business decisions for mer-
chants to decide as it was the impulse for the creation of the bankruptcy
courts during the Italian commercial revolution13 from the XIVth century?
Or should we generalize échevinage considering the increase in judicial tech-
nicalities plus the possible lack of independence from lay judges? The debate
went on in France with strikes from consular judges in 1984, 1997 or again
in 2014 each time a new reform was discussed.
In order to investigate differences in judgments, we get a hold of data
on French businesses with available financial information in Alsace-Moselle
and the bordering counties (département administratif ). Half of the firms
are in Alsace-Moselle (51%). We choose to use survival analysis to under-
stand filing decisions by the firms; choice of bankruptcy proceedings by the
court (either liquidation or reorganisation); and lastly how courts are able
to shut down non-viable businesses (either directly or by stopping the re-
organisation process). We start following firms from the implementation
of a new bankruptcy rating by Altares-D&B in march 2011 with monthly
updates over a year14. We consider firms being “at-risk” when their rating
dropped over a month, meaning an increase in their bankruptcy risk over
the next twelve months. We then study the possible outcomes: a raise in
their rating and drops in their bankruptcy risk; filing for bankruptcy; or a
voluntary shut-down with no debt issues. We want to test court’s efficiency
ex-ante examining how fast firms file for bankruptcy after being “at-risk”.
We test ex-post efficiency looking at the liquidation and survival rates of
firms that were reorganised. We look at ex-post efficiency only for Type-I
errors, reorganisation of firms that should have been liquidated. We cannot
infer relative efficiency of courts for Type-II errors, firms that are liquidated
which should have been reorganized.
12We follow Blazy et al. (2011): a bankruptcy law is ex-ante efficient when failing firms
have incentives to file rather than let their financial information get worse off.
13Polanyi and MacIver, 1944
14The European debt crisis started only one year before this date. There is no reason
to think Alsace-Moselle firms faced a different situation than firms from the rest of France
except for geographical reasons, such as proximity to Germany. We measure this proximity
by the distance to the administrative line that separates both areas.
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We find that bankruptcy rates are smaller in mixed-court jurisdictions
than in lay courts (1.11% vs. 1.51%). This result must be related with lower
chances of being reorganised within mixed courts (30% vs. 48%). Survival
analysis also allows for comparing the times to decisions. They are similar
for all outcomes except for reorganisation that happens faster in lay courts.
Lay courts might increase incentives to trigger the procedure more quickly
and to preserve the value of the debtor’s assets. Lay courts could be more
efficient ex-ante. Yet this hinders the fact that lay courts show the same
liquidation rates as mixed court. Indeed when the court decides that the
firm can be reorganised, it can still abort the plan, and liquidate the firm if
the reorganisation process fails.
We show that the reorganisation rates from lay courts hide more type-I
errors, i.e. reorganised firms that should be liquidated. While mixed courts,
despite lower ex-ante incentives to file for bankruptcy, have similar perfor-
mances over the re-allocation of capital, in screening non-viable firms through
liquidation.
To the best of our knowledge, we report the first evidence of deviations
in applying bankruptcy law brought by structural differences. Even with a
same set of laws, both organisations do not have the same bankruptcy policy.
Furthermore, both courts’ organisations have similar results regarding their
ability to screen out non-viable firms. A welfare cost analysis would proba-
bly show entrepreneurs outside Alsace-Moselle being better off with better
chances of reorganisation, while creditors would rather have less uncertainty
regarding their debt collection. Since this idea raises an endogeneity issue,
we make a robustness check with a 2SLS model. Échevinage is instrumented
with local tax rate. The coefficient showing the impact of échevinage is re-
duced. We find overall similar results in terms of significance except from
some of our subsample.
The rest of the chapter proceeds as follows. Section II gives more back-
ground about the comparison between échevinage and consular judges. Sec-
tion III develops our empirical strategy. Section IV provides information on
the data used in the samples. Section V analyses the impact of échevinage
ex-ante in filing for bankruptcy, in the selection of a proceeding and in the
liquidation process. Section VI concludes.
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2 Context
2.1 History of French bankruptcy/commercial courts
Bankruptcy courts date back to the 15th century in France. They are first
created due to the economic vitality of commercial fairs and the need to
regulate conflicts between merchants in a fast way but also knowing the
customs of each business activity. These two challenges drove the creation
of the inspiring consular justice in Italy. Commercial courts start to appear
in France in 1419 in Lyon, 1549 in Toulouse, 1536 in Rouen. The key year
for bankruptcy courts is generally set to 1563. Under the impulse of the
chancellor Michel de L’Hospital, Charles IX gives a royal edict which allows
every city to have its bankruptcy court and creates the Parisian commercial
court 15.
This royal edict first gives a legal framework inspired by local organisa-
tions. It sets the rules to elect the consular judges asking for merchants to
rule benevolently. In 1673, Colbert extends commercial courts to the whole
French territory. In 1721, there are already 73 courts16. Subsequently, in the
XVIIIth century, bankruptcy needs to be filed under ordinary justice, while
debt inventory is done by consular judges. The French revolution maintains
consular justice in 1790 and allows each French department to create com-
mercial courts where they are deemed needed. The 1807 Code of Commerce
is another milestone for commercial justice in France. In the article 615, the
number and location of commercial courts is left to public administration.
The Prussian victory over France leads to the annexation of Alsace-
Moselle. Commercial courts are replaced as described by the Empire law of
the 27th of January, 1877. Business disputes are given to regional courts con-
sisting of a professional judge as president and two non-professional judges
(Handelsrichter)17. The latter are inspired by the French model of a spe-
cialised commercial justice.
This exception is upheld by a French law in 1923 and even extended
to Sarreguemines and Thionville in 1978, and Saverne in 1989. In Alsace-
Moselle, commercial law is served in a special chamber of the regional courts
(Tribunal de Grande Instance). This chamber is composed of a professional
15As noted by Jean, 2007.
16We use the work of Coutant, 1998 to build this historical perspective.
17Article 100 of the organization law of the 27, January 1877.
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judge acting as president and two consular judges elected since June 192418.
2.2 Differences in organisation of French bankruptcy courts
Most of the French bankruptcy organisation in France is made of 134 com-
mercial courts over mainland France including only 7 mixed courts in Alsace-
Moselle (plus 9 mixed courts overseas). Commercial court is a specialized
first degree court. Bankruptcy is one of its area of expertise but so are com-
mercial disputes and various commercial acts. In Alsace-Moselle, commercial
issues are decided in commercial chambers from a Tribunal de Grande In-
stance, i.e. the French equivalent to High Courts.
Each commercial court is composed by one president of the court who
is elected for four years by the other bankruptcy judges. While in Alsace-
Moselle, the president of the court is a career judge. Bankruptcy judges,
rather called consular judges are merchants or business persons chosen by
their peers through a two-stage election. Their first mandate lasts two years
and they can be reelected for four years up to four times19.
In Alsace-Moselle, some small business disputes are settled outside the
commercial chamber. But the bankruptcies are only filed in the commer-
cial chamber. The president of the chamber cannot be replaced by another
consular judge unlike in the rest of France (art. L. 731-4 of the Code of
Commerce). Last, it is the duty of the president to prevent financial and
economic distress in its jurisdiction. This can raise an issue in Alsace-Moselle
since legal training may not help professional judges in setting the best or-
ganisation to do so. But they can get advice from consular judges who assist
them.
2.3 French bankruptcy judges
There are three explanations for the success of consular justice. For the
state, it is seen as a cheap organisation, even if Montebourg and F., 1998
has shown that this argument should be qualified with the reimbursement
of some of the consular judges’ expenses. It has always been a fast justice
compared to the ordinary one. Tenants of the lay courts deem that decision-
making is a lot faster than in usual courts. And the business expertise of
18This part was complete with the work of Strickler, 2018.
19Except for the residing president of the court who can be reelected a fifth time.
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the judges is also supposedly appreciated by the debtors. However the latter
argument should be questioned depending on the size of the firm, and the
size of the court. In the biggest court such as Paris, many consular judges
are senior executives with very different experiences and opinions on business
compared to small firm entrepreneurs.
The legitimacy of lay judges is the main subject of criticism by the legal
professionals who question their impartiality. This is all truer for French
bankruptcy judges. While consisting of volunteers, some courts have been
accused of collusion in their judgments (see Gaudino, 1998; Montebourg and
F., 1998; GRECO, 2014). Since 2018, lay judges need to take the vow and
have ethical obligations like the other French magistrates with a specific code
of ethics.
If there is a challenge of a consular judge, the Code of Civil Proceeding
(article 349) and if the judge opposes this challenge or does not answer,
the matter is decided by the president of the court, and not the superior
jurisdiction. There is no possibility to plea afterwards.
As such, involving a legal professional should enhance the transparency
of the decisions. It would also prevent international investors to avoid some
opportunities because of the uniqueness of French bankruptcy courts.Provine
(1998) actually shows that although decisions by lay judges are similar to
those of professional judges, the main difference deals with the cautiousness
from plaintiffs. Lay judges’ decisions are perceived as less predictable to
career judges because of personal interpretation of the law (Deffains, 2010).
The decision to leave commercial judicial affairs to merchants, based
on their expertise, was often discussed. With commercial law becoming
more and more complex, the need for deep legal knowledge was also deemed
important. The 2016 reform in Justice lead to mandatory training starting
November 2018 : 8-day initial training then 2 days per year. Professional
judges consider that this training is not enough with a commercial law piling
many different legal area (labour, finance, commercial per se) in such a short
amount of time relative to their legal training.
Aside from these arguments, the French policy debate seems to revolve
around a cost-benefit analysis. Actually, adding a legal professional to pre-
side the court is an expensive measure. It implies to increase recruitment
while the decisions over the extension of public forces is strongly debated.
Lay courts provide a nearly costless institution which partly explains why
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échevinage remains limited to Alsace-Moselle. The absence of legal profes-
sionals also allows for the court’s organisation to be less formal.
3 Data
3.1 Sources and data selection
Data on bankruptcies can be found in many legal sources ranging from le-
gal advertisements in newspapers to official publications in the Bodacc. Our
dataset originates from Altares, a French company specialized in the gather-
ing and homogenization of these various sources of information on corporate
bankruptcy. Altares-D&B allowed us to use all these various sources to en-
sure we do not lack some events after a firm has filed for bankruptcy. We
can infer all the judicial process from its filing to the end of the bankruptcy.
Since Altares data lack information on the creditors (identity, due claims,
debt collection), we focus on the proceeding’s success and the firm’s sur-
vival. To do so, we merge this information with the Courts’ decisions and
the survival of firms.
To estimate the probability of bankruptcy, we used the monthly scores of
all French firms from the launch of Altares-D&B new score in March 2011 and
for 13 months. The score is computed for all French firms but we wanted
to be able to test for other information than the score. It estimates the
likelihood of insolvency proceedings (safeguarding procedure, administration
or winding up) within 12 months with a logistic regression. It is made of a
combination of variables (for example: Has published / Obligation to publish
/ Age of latest publication), mostly financial ratios and aggregates. We can
map the logistic output of the score with a bankruptcy risk within the next
12 months. The score was then broken into risk-buckets into 4, 20, and 100
levels.
We select only firms with financial information publicly available within
the 24 months before the firm is scored. Our sample contains only firms
created at least two years before the score. Distressed firms tend to stop
publishing their financial information. But the selection bias is limited by
the use of profitability and size ratios. It ensures that possible differences
in financial information availability between Alsace-Moselle and the rest of
France do not bias our results. Overall financial information is available only
for roughly a third of all French businesses. Its availability increases with
11
the size of the firm. More than half of bankrupt firms that have at least one
employee have available financial information. This increases to 80% of the
firms that have more than 50 employees 20.
We use several financial ratios, four to define the size of the firm and one
for the profitability. We have limited ourselves to five ratios/indicators and
tested them to prevent collinearity with our bankruptcy rating which is also
based on financial information. The size of the assets is a good measure of
the economic weight of the firm. This size will give incentives to court to
let the firm reorganise. At the same time, the more the assets, the harder
it is to reorganise in case of economic distress. The turnover of the firm is
an alternative measure of size which depends on the yearly business activity.
It needs to be taken into account with a profitability ratio to see if the firm
is solvent. We take profit with the EBIT over the sales for our profitability
ratio. The last important size ratio is the number of employees. As for the
size of the assets, it should give incentives to the court to let the firm be
reorganized and, at the same time, a firm which is too big may have reduced
chances to reorganise if the firm needs to change its business model and its
use of labour.
We also have general business information given by the French census.
We can include the firm’s age, its business activity, its legal form and its
location. We use the latter to compute the distance to the administrative
line that separates Alsace-Moselle from the rest of France. As in Chemin
and Wasmer, 2009, we reduce our geographical selection of firms to Alsace-
Moselle and the neighbour French departments. We select all the six depart-
ments that share an administrative border with Alsace-Moselle21. Our sam-
ple contains 60 000 observations in Alsace-Moselle and the districts nearby.
3.2 Descriptive statistics
We compare firms located in Alsace-Moselle to other French firms outside of
this area. We consider successively our whole sample (Table 1) and next two
subsampless. The first subsample uses the administrative line that separates
Alsace-Moselle from the rest of France. We get the first quartile of firms
that reside the closest to the administrative line on each side (Table 2).
By doing so, we limit the influence of Germany on Alsace-Moselle firms.
20See Esquerre, 2014 for the breakdown by size.
21Doubs, Meurthe-et-Moselle, Meuse, Haute-Saône, Vosges and Territoire de Belfort.
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Firms next to the border may have different business activities due to their
proximity to Germany than in the rest of France. Also firms the closest
have greater chances of sharing similar business opportunities, culture and
employment zone. The second subsample selects only the firms with the
highest bankruptcy score before the increase in bankruptcy risk (Table 3).
We select the firms in the highest of the four risk buckets proposed by Altares’
score, called Very high risk. In this state of financial distress, the firms have
less opportunities on out-of-court settlements. Out-of-court settlements may
be different depending on local culture in Alsace-Moselle versus the rest
of France. In this subsample, the incentive to file for bankruptcy heavily
depends on the expectations of the court.
We want to estimate the probability of bankruptcy after the firm has an
increase in its bankruptcy risk. The score allows us to do so when the firm’s
20-score drop by at least one unit. Our main concern is to check whether
the risk distribution over firms is different in Alsace-Moselle and in the other
area. We have two means to do so. First, looking at the distribution in
the four risk buckets of the Altares score (from very low to very high risk).
Then, we look at the estimated chances of bankruptcy. Since each score can
be matched to a bankruptcy risk we can compute an average probability
risk.
The estimated risk is relatively the same throughout all samples. The
distribution in risk buckets shows that Alsace Moselle has more firms with
very high bankruptcy risk. Yet when we focus on this subpopulation only
(Table 3), the estimated risk is a 1-percentage point higher than outside
Alsace-Moselle. We see a similar difference in Table 2. This explains why
we use estimated risk rather than the risk buckets in our empirical model.
Overall firms looked really similar on average on both sides of the ad-
ministrative border. Looking only at financial variables, we observe that
firms in Alsace-Moselle are marginally bigger, considering both their size of
assets and number of employees (see Table 1). This remains true when we
look closely at firms within the closest distance to the administrative line
(Table 2), or in the very bankruptcy risk bucket (Table 3). In the first two
tables, firms in Alsace Moselle are shown to be less profitable than their
counterparts (shown by their profit, EBIT, as a share of their sales). It is
only in Table 3 that we have a reverse situation with profitability ratio lower
in Alsace-Moselle than in the rest of France, yet standard deviation is also
13
higher (20 vs. 19).
Apart from the risk and financial ratios, we have two other main sets of
controls: business activity and legal forms. Both can have huge impact. If
an area were more specialized in a specific type of business, differences in
bankruptcy rates between the two areas could be explained by heterogeneity
on how they cope with economic bad times. Only two sectors differ by
more than a percentage point in our whole sample, manufacturing (16%
in Alsace Moselle vs. 19% outside) and wholesale-retail (33% vs. 30%).
Fortunately, our subsample with only the closest firms resolve this issue
(Table 2), even if the discrepancies for the Manufacturing sector slightly
increase to 2 percentage points.
The concern over legal forms depends on limited liability. Firms with
normal or simplified LLC differ only marginally on this issue. More than four
out of five firms are LLC firms on both sides of the administrative line. In
all our samples, the other legal forms are scarce and the differences between
the two sides of the administrative border are lower than 1 percentage point.
4 Identification strategy
4.1 Survival analysis
In the first step of our strategy, we want to estimate the ex-ante efficiency
of each type of Court. To do so, we analyse the choices made by the Court
when the firms file for bankruptcy and the delays from the moment a firm
becomes at risk and the time when it is reorganised or liquidated. Actually,
after a firm becomes at risk and enters our sample, several outcomes are
possible: (i) its bankruptcy risk drops because its situation improves and
its score increases toward a lower risk ; (ii) the managers decide to shut
down the firm without filing for bankruptcy if there is no dispute with the
creditors ; (iii) filing for bankruptcy. Because of all these outcomes, we
choose a competing risk model.
We want to analyse the filing for bankruptcy in general but also the choice
made by the Court, between the three above mentioned legal proceedings
as mentioned before. We summarize all possible outcomes in Table 1. We
choose to assume independent censoring between events with the controls we
have set on. This may be a strong assumption, it would mean for example
that the times to liquidation or to reorganisation for the same firm would not
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be affected by one another. In reality, both potential outcomes are strongly
linked. Yet the discrete-time setting and the number of events prevent to do
otherwise.
Despite a compete-risk setting, we thus compare bankruptcy to all the
other outcomes (censuring, voluntary shut-down, economic improvement)
combined. Upon modeling the filing for bankruptcy of firms for example, we
consider firms that are better off after few months as censored. They leave
our sample. It is the same for firms that enter our sample and with no event
until the end of the study period. To check how strong this assumption is,
we have decided to test the effect of échevinage on all possible outcomes (see
in Appendix 7.2). Less than 0.1% of the firms are voluntary shut-down (19
firms in our sample). We assume their effects is non-significant. Around 18%
of the firms in our sample are better off after some time. But looking at the
cumulative incidence functions (see figure 1), firms are not affected by their
location in or outside Alsace-Moselle since the two curves are juxtaposed.
In the second stage of our modeling, we consider all liquidations whether
they happen at the tile of filing or afterwards, despite the firm being engaged
into reorganisation. A sale as a going concern is also treated as a liquidation.
This models the ability of the court to reallocate misused capital through the
liquidation process. We consider only two states “being at risk” and “being
liquidated” as in a simple survival model. The model is more straightforward
than the previous one. The estimation is still based on a piece-wise constant
hazard ratio with the same time dummies as previously.
The first condition to observe a timely process is to consider a point in
time where the firms become at risk. Since we follow firms using bankruptcy
risk derived by a failure score, we cannot use information before March 2011.
To do so and prevent our sample from left truncation, we define “at risk”
firms that suffer from an increase in their bankruptcy risk. The Altares-D&B
score is summarized in 20 risk-buckets. A firm enters our sample when its
score rating drops from at least one risk-bucket.
The hazard ratio hi,s,t is the probability for a firm to change from being
“at risk” until time t to a certain state s precisely at time t. We study mainly
three changes of state : filing for bankruptcy, being accepted to reorganise,
and being liquidated. The hazard ratio is composed of two parts: a function
of time, and an exponential form that includes all the firm characteristics
we want to control for. Because we have monthly observations, we choose
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a discrete-survival time model with a piece-constant hazard. This means
that the effect of time is the same for all firms that experienced a change
of state after a same period of time. We study changes of states between
April 201122 and April 2012. Observations from data show that the impact
of time remains nearly constant after six months being at risk. We thus limit
our time function to six occurrences: one for each month between the first
month after the firm becomes at risk and the fifth and then a last occurrence
ranging from the sixth month onward.
We thus estimate:
hi,s,t = h0(t) exp(β ∗ Échevinage+ δ ∗ Controls+ i)
where h0(t) =
6∑
k=1
1t=k
4.2 Alsace-Moselle as an identifying strategy
Chemin and Wasmer, 2009 use differences between Alsace-Moselle and the
rest of France to measure the increase of employment after a decrease in max-
imum working hours. By doing so, they provide a list of the main drawbacks
in using such comparison and in particular the vicinity of Germany with
Alsace-Moselle. We thus decide to take into account how firms may differ
the further we go from the administrative border because of this vicinity. To
do so, we compare our overall results with a sub-sample of firms in a buffer
zone around this separation. We build up our sample by creating quartiles in
each area depending on the distance between the administrative border and
the firm’s location. Our sub-sample is only composed of the nearest quartile
to the line.
In this chapter, we want to test the efficiency of the court on the deci-
sions to file and on how the firms are treated along bankruptcy. It is possible
that in Alsace-Moselle, debtors and creditors are more or less keen to accept
out-of-court settlement compared to the rest of France. To ensure that the
firms have no other alternative than filing for bankruptcy, we create an-
other subsample with only the firms with that are in the highest bankruptcy
22Even though we have information starting March 2011, we study firm with an increase
in risk, thus firms cannot enter our sample before April.
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risk bucket (very high risk) before entering our sample23. Considering this
subsample is more convenient than including an interaction term. It allows
differences in magnitude in the coefficients of the other variables. Otherwise
we could not control potential structural discrepancies in the number of high
risk firms within both sides of the administrative border. The signs of the
coefficients may also differ for control variables such as the dummies for the
business activity. For example, old mining industry in Alsace or construction
firms that may be more at risk in less profitable area.
We reproduce these two sub-samples when we model endogeneity in
the firm’s location. The choice of location should indeed depend on the
bankruptcy risk that the firm is facing. As soon as the bankruptcy risk ex-
ceeds a certain threshold, entrepreneurs would be better off outside Alsace-
Moselle since they would rather have their firms reorganised. Yet, knowing
this, creditors would rather finance firms in Alsace-Moselle where they would
be less forced to agree upon reorganisation of firms, that is where they have
less chances of being forced into negotiation over their exposures. We as-
sume here that creditors have a liquidation bias : if a firm goes bankrupt,
they would be better off after a liquidation than being forced to reorganise
their credit towards it. Most empirical papers agree on this bias (see for
example Blazy and Chopard, 2012). We use an instrumental variable, prop-
erty tax which should give incentives for many firms to choose a location,
because of their owner or because of their employees. Its effects on the risk of
bankruptcy is small. We model this decision of the location of the firm with
a 2SLS model which first models the location then the survival, assuming we
can replace the logit model of time-discrete survival with a linear probability
model. We assume it is is a first good approximation to tackle this possible
endogeneity issue.
5 Main results
As mentioned above, we use the overall sample plus two subsampless to
check for the effect of échevinage. Each of our estimation compares the same
model for all the observations, then for the firms that are the nearest to the
23Their 20-buckets score is below 8, which means that they have a 2.56% chance to file
for bankruptcy within the next 12 months. It is nearly four times more chances than the
entire sample when the score was created (average of 0.71%).
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administrative border; and last for the firms belonging to the very high risk
bucket before their rating decreased.
5.1 Filing for bankruptcy and filing for reorganisation
In table 4, we compare the filing for bankruptcy with the two other potential
outcomes: decrease in the firm bankruptcy risk and the decision to simply
shut down the firm24. We provide our estimations for all the other outcomes
in the Appendix. We then provide in Table 5 the chances to be reorganised
in a Redressement Judiciaire for all the firms at risk25.
All financial variables have expected coefficients and their coefficients
are consistent across the three samples when significant. Meanwhile most
financial ratios have non-significant coefficients. Profitability has a negative
(as expected) and significant value. The more the firms are profitable, the
more chances they have to avoid bankruptcy. It is especially true in the
last subsample where the impact of profitability decreases (from −1.1% to
−0.6%) with firms having less chance to be better off. The estimated risk
plays a key role in explaining the decision to file for bankruptcy. It is also
the case for the age of the firm : the older the firm, the less chance to file
for bankruptcy when at risk. The younger firms must have less ability to
recover when distressed. Older firms can ask for delays with their business
partners or their banks.
The effect of mixed courts appears obvious on the first and third column.
The coefficient decreases from −0.24 to −0.30 between the two columns.
Firms with the most chances to file for bankruptcy should delay more their
filing in Alsace-Moselle. In our first subsample, restricting to firms that
are the closest to the administrative border, the coefficient is of the same
magnitude but no longer significant.
The strong impact of our échevinage variable questions ex-ante efficiency
of mixed courts : we wonder whether this delay is explained by a different
bankruptcy policy between mixed and lay courts. We look at the results in
Table 5 when we model only the filing for reorganisation (excluding liquida-
tion) for the firms that file for bankruptcy looking at all the firms that are
24Let us recall that the difference between this decision and filing for liquidation depends
on the absence of unpaid creditors.
25We focus only on this proceeding because of the very small number of filings in Sauve-
garde which is usual in France.
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at risk.
Due to the narrow time period, the estimation of this risk can only be
limited to just a few observations (157 reorganisations over the whole sam-
ple). The coefficient associated with échevinage is strongly negative in all
samples. When looking only at the closest firms to the administrative bor-
der in Table 4, the coefficient of échevinage remains at the same level but
its significance level drops. This result questions the contrasts between the
two areas, we could fear that our other results only reveal on structural dif-
ferences between firms in the two regions. The results in Table 5 show that
mixed court also plays a significant effect on the filing for reorganisation also
in this subsample. The order of magnitude is in line with the one on the
overall sample. The effect is once again higher for the sample with only high
bankruptcy risk firm.
We must link this result with the one found in our previous regression on
the impact of mixed courts on filing. Knowing they have fewer chances to be
reorganised, they may hope for a reversal of their economic situation, and
thus delay filing for bankruptcy. Because of fewer chances to be reorganised,
courts in Alsace-Moselle incite firms to delay decisions in filing. This could
lead to more failures in reorganisation: the firm could wait too long in an
attempt to be reorganised leading to higher overall liquidation rate in mixed
courts.
The coefficient of the estimated risk is also very strong in explaining fil-
ing for reorganisation. The rating and thus the estimated risk are indeed
a good summary of the situation of the firm before the filing. And many
papers such as Radulovic (2008) and Blazy et al. (2011) have already shown
that the previous financial situation of the firm is the main driver of its fate
in bankruptcy. The other financial variables and the profitability do not
disoplay significant coefficient for the most part. The number of employees
has a strong significant effect on the whole sample but its effect becomes
non-significant on our two subsampless. As such, in the third column where
we restrict our sample to very high risk firms, the magnitude and signifi-
cance of the estimated risk drops while the coefficient of size — measured
as total assets — becomes strongly positive and significant. It is usual for
the relationship between size and bankruptcy to be positive as we control
for profitability. Larger firm will attempt to reorganise.
19
5.2 Success of reorganisation and screening non-viable firms
We have shown that lay courts have a stronger “reorganisation-policy” than
their mixed counterparts. Our second question is thus to check how thes
two policies have effects on the success of reorganisation and bankruptcy in
general, depending on the type of courts. We assume that the differences be-
tween mixed and lay courts may be linked with differences in their screening
of non-viable firms.
Mixed courts may discourage viable firms to file for bankruptcy because
of fewer chances of a reorganisation proceeding. Doing so, they could delay
the filing for reorganisation of firms so much that these firms end up being
too distressed to have a successful reorganisation. Meanwhile, lay courts
could allow for too many firms to be reorganised even if they are not viable.
To test these questions, we model the failures in reorganisation process, that
is reorganisation which end up being converted to liquidation (Table 6).
The results in Table 6 show that mixed courts do not harm the reorgan-
isation process by delaying too much entry for viable firms. Rather than
implying an increase in type II errors, i.e. allowing reorganisation for firms
that would be liquidated in the end, mixed courts tend to have fewer failures
when they agreed on the reorganisation. But this conclusion must be miti-
gated. The coefficients are hard to interpret because of their magnitude and
the complete absence of significance. We can still rule out that the ex-ante
fewer chances of reorganisation do not preclude the process to succeed.
Two sub-questions follow. Does the fact that lay courts tend to reorganise
more often prevent them to liquidate reorganised firms that appear non-
viable? If so, is there a persistence in potential type II errors from these
courts ? On the other hand, does the lower reorganisation chance in mixed
courts prevent them from liquidating non-viable firms out of the market?
Managers and shareholders may be incited to delay their entry in bankruptcy
as much as they can, resulting in lessened overall liquidation rates.
To answer the above questions we compare overall liquidation, either
directly at filing or once the firm has failed to reorganise. We use otherwise
the same model as before and the results are reported in Table 7. Looking at
the sign of the coefficient of the échevinage variable, mixed courts look like
they ensure overall less frequent liquidation. The coefficient is stable over
the whole sample and the subsamples. But the absence of significance and
the magnitude of their standard deviation is most probably explained by the
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lack of differences between the two types of courts.
We conclude that there is no over-liquidation after reorganisation in lay
courts; but also that the mixed-courts policy does not harm the bankruptcy
process in liquidating viable firms. Type-I errors are limited by the ability
of both courts to liquidate firms through the whole bankruptcy process.
6 Conclusion
This chapter concludes with contrasted results. Though lay courts are more
appealing ex-ante due to their reorganisation rates, they do not provide less
overall liquidation (direct and after the filing) of distressed firms. The main
difference between the two types of courts, according to our results, is the
way they deal with bankrupt firms: i) lay courts giving more time to firms
during an observation period, while demonstrating their ability to prevent
maintaining zombie firms as shown by their overall liquidation rate ; ii) mixed
courts screen firm more harshly on filing, examining their financial statement
but do not “over-liquidate” firms. To some extent, we could analyse these
two courts’ structures as being more or less reorganisation-oriented given a
same bankruptcy law. And we see that the consequences of this conclusion
depends on the creditors’ reaction.
Our results are nonetheless lacking because of the absence of recovery
rates for the creditors and follow-up of the entrepreneurs. Further research
should build on these two subjects, how much our results affect credit con-
ditions, and in particular interest rates, but also business creation. Both
effects should be difficult to disentangled.
We use the French system to compare both lay courts and mixed courts.
Throughout the world, most bankruptcy courts are composed only of legal
professionals. It would thus be all the more interesting to check whether
we can derive similar results as in mixed courts, even if evidence has been
provided that mixed courts with lay judges do not obviously differ from
professional judges (see Philippe, 2017).
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Appendix
6.1 French bankruptcy law
As of 2016, Firms that file for bankruptcy can decide between three proceed-
ings : two reorganisation ones (Sauvegarde and Redressement Judiciaire) and
a liquidation one (Liquidation Judiciaire). The latter is similar to the US
Chapter 7 and only consists in ensuring debt collection by creditors. Like in
the US, most firms are eventually liquidated. Overall, two-thirds of bankrupt
firms file for direct liquidation 26.
Only the legal representatives of a company can file for Sauvegarde, a
solvent reorganisation proceedings, if the firm is not yet cash-flow insolvent.
26Source: author’s computation from Altares-D&B data.
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This requires much anticipation by the firm.The court will appoint a judicial
administrator to supervise or assist the debtor company’s management in
the drawing up of the safeguard plan.
When a firm becomes insolvent27 either creditors or debtors can ask for
the filing for bankruptcy. Before 2012, the court could also decide for the
firm to file for bankruptcy. When a debtor or a creditor seizes the court,
the choice between the proceedings is made by the court only using the
information at the time of the filing. After the firm has filed for bankruptcy,
the debtor company is allowed a stay of payments and proceedings.
In both reorganisation proceedings, if the court considers that the busi-
ness may be continued as a going concern, it will order an “observation
period ” that can be last for up to 18 months. In practice, it is common
for reorganisation to last 24 months before a reorganisation plan is agreed
upon. Despite these regular meetings, the reorganisation process can be in-
terrupted at any time if the firm is deemed non-viable and then processed
toward liquidation.
A court-appointed judicial administrator investigates the affairs of the
debtor and make proposals for the reorganisation of its business. A credi-
tors’ representative in charge of collecting statements of claims and verifying
the debtor’s liabilities is also appointed. Members of the creditors’ commit-
tee may also present their own alternative safeguard plan. While the two
reorganisation proceedings mostly differ on the magnitude of the financial
distress, Sauvegarde is a Chapter 11-inspired process where managers remain
on charge of the firm’s activity. Yet it is rarely used, only 2% of bankrupt
firms file for this proceeding every year28.
A debtor company that is insolvent must apply for the opening of insol-
vency proceedings within 45 days of the occurrence of cash-flow insolvency,
unless it has requested the appointment of a conciliator or the opening of
liquidation proceedings. At the end of the observation period, the court will
make an order either for either (i) the continuation of the debtor’s operations
by way of a reorganisation plan; or (ii) the sale as a going concern or (iii)
failing, the liquidation of the debtor company. More than 70 % of reorgani-
27As defined in art. 620-1 and following of the French Commercial Code, the cessation
de paiement is a vague definition when a firm cannot pay the due liabilities. This can give
power to the court to record insolvency or delay filing.
28Source: author’s computation from Altares-D&B data.
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sation filings ended up being liquidated afterwards in 201029. In our chapter
we regroup both liquidation and sale as going concern since they are both
failures to reorganise.
29Source : Battle et al., 2014.
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Figure 1 – Cumulative Incidence function on filing for bankruptcy
27
Figure 2 – Cumulative Incidence function on filing for bankruptcy
Figure 3 – Kaplan-Meier on chances of overall liquidation
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6.2 Non-parametric survival statistics
6.3 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 – Summary statistics for all observations at risk
The table displays information on the dependent and control variables used in the
tests. The risk variables contain the distribution in risk buckets, from very low
to very high bankruptcy risk over the next twelve months. We also computed the
estimated probability of bankruptcy derived with the firm scoring as decided when
the scoring was implemented. The profitability ratio (Profit as a share of Sales) was
cut on its first and last centile because of its effect on the mean value. We have
checked it has no further impact on our model estimation.
Outside Alsace-Moselle Alsace-Moselle
mean sd mean sd
Dependent variables
Decrease in risk 0.18 0.39 0.18 0.38
Shut-down 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.01
Bankruptcy 0.02 0.12 0.01 0.11
Reorganisation - Sauv 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03
Reorganisation - RJ 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.06
Direct liquidation 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08
Overall liquidation 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.09
Risk
Very low risk 0.05 0.22 0.04 0.21
Low risk 0.24 0.42 0.22 0.42
High risk 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42
Very high risk 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.50
Estimated risk 0.05 0.12 0.05 0.10
Financial controls
Log(1+size of assets) 12.56 1.59 12.70 1.66
Profitability (%) -1.28 17.11 -1.77 17.75
Log(1+sales) 13.11 1.57 13.30 1.65
Log(1+age) 4.75 0.91 4.90 0.87
Log(1+nbr of empl.) 1.63 1.17 1.74 1.23
Business activity
Manufacturing 0.19 0.40 0.16 0.36
Construction 0.27 0.44 0.26 0.44
Wholesale-retail 0.30 0.46 0.33 0.47
Transportation-storage 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.19
Accommodation-food serv. 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.28
Inform.-Com. 0.02 0.15 0.03 0.16
Real estate 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.20
Administrative-support activ. 0.04 0.19 0.05 0.21
Energy, Water, Waste mgmt 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.11
Legal form
Others 0.04 0.20 0.05 0.22
LLC 0.82 0.38 0.82 0.39
Simpl. LLC 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34
Observations 13,358 13,905
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Table 2 – Summary statistics for sample A
The table displays information on the dependent and control variables used in the
tests for the closest firm to the administrative line. The risk variables contain the
distribution in risk buckets, from very low to very high bankruptcy risk over the next
twelve months. We also computed the estimated probability of bankruptcy derived
with the firm scoring as decided when the scoring was implemented. The profitability
ratio (Profit as a share of Sales) was cut on its first and last centile because of its
effect on the mean value. We have checked it has no further impact on our model
estimation.
(1) (2)
Outside Alsace-Moselle Alsace-Moselle
mean sd mean sd
Dependent variables
Decrease in risk 0.17 0.38 0.18 0.38
Shut-down 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.01
Bankruptcy 0.02 0.13 0.01 0.11
Reorganisation - Sauv 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.03
Reorganisation - RJ 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.07
Direct liquidation 0.01 0.08 0.01 0.08
Overall liquidation 0.01 0.10 0.01 0.09
Risk
Very low risk 0.05 0.21 0.04 0.20
Low risk 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42
High risk 0.23 0.42 0.23 0.42
Very high risk 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Estimated risk 0.06 0.13 0.05 0.09
Financial controls
Log(1+size of assets) 12.48 1.57 12.68 1.65
Profitability (%) -1.14 16.54 -1.34 16.30
Log(1+sales) 13.03 1.54 13.27 1.62
Log(1+age) 4.69 0.91 4.88 0.87
Log(1+nbr of empl.) 1.59 1.15 1.73 1.21
Business activity
Manufacturing 0.18 0.38 0.18 0.38
Construction 0.27 0.44 0.29 0.45
Wholesale-retail 0.30 0.46 0.29 0.45
Transportation-storage 0.03 0.17 0.04 0.20
Accommodation-food serv. 0.10 0.30 0.09 0.29
Inform.-Com. 0.03 0.17 0.02 0.15
Real estate 0.04 0.18 0.03 0.18
Administrative-support activ. 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.20
Energy, Water, Waste mgmt 0.01 0.11 0.01 0.09
Legal form
Others 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.21
LLC 0.85 0.36 0.82 0.39
Simpl. LLC 0.12 0.32 0.14 0.34
Observations 4,439 4,695
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Table 3 – Summary statistics for firms with very high bankruptcy risk
The table displays information on the dependent and control variables used in the
tests for the firms the most at bankruptcy risk. The risk variables contain the
distribution in risk buckets, from very low to very high bankruptcy risk over the next
twelve months. We also computed the estimated probability of bankruptcy derived
with the firm scoring as decided when the scoring was implemented. The profitability
ratio (Profit as a share of Sales) was cut on its first and last centile because of its
effect on the mean value. We have checked it has no further impact on our model
estimation.
(1) (2)
Outside Alsace-Moselle Alsace-Moselle
mean sd mean sd
Dependent variables
Decrease in risk (%) 0.23 0.42 0.24 0.43
Shut-down (%) 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.02
Bankruptcy (%) 0.04 0.18 0.03 0.16
Reorganisation - Sauv 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.04
Reorganisation - RJ 0.02 0.14 0.01 0.09
Direct liquidation 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.13
Overall liquidation 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.14
Risk
Estimated risk 0.11 0.14 0.10 0.12
Financial controls
Log(1+size of assets) 12.20 1.55 12.30 1.58
Profitability (%) -6.46 20.03 -6.12 19.05
Log(1+sales) 12.85 1.49 13.01 1.53
Log(1+age) 4.42 0.91 4.58 0.90
Log(1+nbr of empl.) 1.53 1.13 1.63 1.15
Business activity
Manufacturing 0.18 0.39 0.15 0.36
Construction 0.33 0.47 0.32 0.47
Wholesale-retail 0.26 0.44 0.29 0.45
Transportation-storage 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.20
Accommodation-food serv. 0.09 0.28 0.09 0.29
Inform.-Com. 0.02 0.14 0.02 0.14
Real estate 0.02 0.14 0.03 0.16
Administrative-support activ. 0.05 0.21 0.06 0.23
Energy, Water, Waste mgmt 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.08
Legal form
Others 0.03 0.18 0.03 0.18
LLC 0.85 0.36 0.85 0.35
Simpl. LLC 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.32
Observations 4,145 4,468
31
32
7 Regression table
7.1 Filing for bankruptcy
Table 4 – Modeling filing for bankruptcy
This table provides an evaluation of échevinage on the sample and the two
subsamples (closest to administrative line and very high risk). We add the
same controls as those described in Table 1, business activity and legal form.
We compare filing with the other two possible outcomes: firm’s shut down
and decrease in bankruptcy risk. We do not provide the coefficients for the
time dummies.
(1) (2) (3)
All obs. Low distance High BR
échevinage (1=yes) −0.235∗ −0.239 −0.302∗
(0.033) (0.180) (0.017)
Estimated risk (%) 0.028∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(1+size of assets) −0.132 −0.156 0.021
(0.061) (0.195) (0.815)
Profitability (%) −0.011∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗ −0.006∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.026)
Log(1+sales) 0.144 0.200 0.112
(0.108) (0.173) (0.316)
Log(1+age) −0.397∗∗∗ −0.357∗∗∗ −0.201∗
(0.000) (0.001) (0.012)
Log(1+nbr of empl.) 0.161 −0.015 0.037
(0.068) (0.918) (0.722)
Constant −4.446∗∗∗ −5.382∗∗∗ −5.787∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Controls Yes
Observations 26, 719 9, 134 13, 254
Events 349 131 317
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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7.2 Filing for reorganisation and risk of liquidation afterward
Table 5 – Modeling filing for reorganisation
This table provides an evaluation of échevinage on the sample and the two
subsamples (closest to administrative line and very high risk). We add the
same controls as those described in Table 1, business activity and legal form.
We compare filing with the other two possible outcomes: firm’s shut down
and decrease in bankruptcy risk
(1) (2) (3)
All obs. Low distance High BR
Échevinage (1=yes) −0.788∗∗∗ −0.637∗ −1.018∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.017) (0.000)
Estimated risk (%) 0.031∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(1+size of assets) 0.185 0.170 0.339∗∗
(0.051) (0.204) (0.004)
Profitability (%) 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.208) (0.319) (0.350)
Log(1+sales) −0.064 −0.144 −0.023
(0.535) (0.373) (0.864)
Log(1+age) −0.410∗∗∗ −0.326∗ −0.179
(0.000) (0.048) (0.128)
Log(1+nbr of empl.) 0.248∗ 0.096 0.042
(0.031) (0.621) (0.763)
Constant −6.287∗∗∗ −5.306∗∗ −8.525∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000)
Controls Yes
Observations 26, 719 9, 134 13, 254
Events 157 61 142
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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Table 6 – Modeling failures in reorganisation
This table provides an evaluation of échevinage after a firm reorganisation
was accepted by the Court and it finally fails. It is based on the whole sample
and the two subsamples (closest to administrative line and very high risk).
We add the same controls as those described in Table 1, business activity and
legal form. We compare filing with the other two possible outcomes: firm’s
shut down and decrease in bankruptcy risk
(1) (2) (3)
All obs. Low distance High BR
Échevinage (1=yes) −0.399 −0.183 −0.551
(0.200) (0.723) (0.116)
Estimated risk (%) 0.013∗ 0.035∗∗∗ 0.012∗
(0.015) (0.000) (0.035)
Log(1+size of assets) 0.405∗ 0.558 0.459
(0.049) (0.069) (0.067)
Profitability (%) −0.011 −0.007 −0.016
(0.135) (0.582) (0.059)
Log(1+sales) −0.129 −0.494 −0.265
(0.588) (0.134) (0.380)
Log(1+age) −0.339∗ −0.570 −0.300
(0.045) (0.077) (0.141)
Log(1+nbr of empl.) −0.098 −0.035 −0.142
(0.662) (0.911) (0.597)
Constant −6.607∗ −0.944 −5.099
(0.038) (0.822) (0.134)
Controls Yes
Observations 157 61 142
Events 58 25 53
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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7.3 Overall liquidation
Table 7 – Modeling overall liquidation
This table provides an evaluation of échevinage on the sample and the two
subsamples (closest to administrative line and very high risk). We add the
same controls as those described in Table 1, business activity and legal form.
We compare filing with the other two possible outcomes: firm’s shut down
and decrease in bankruptcy risk
(1) (2) (3)
All obs. Low distance High BR
Échevinage (1=yes) −0.062 −0.072 −0.080
(0.639) (0.729) (0.598)
Estimated risk (%) 0.027∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Log(1+size of assets) −0.129 −0.112 0.014
(0.096) (0.417) (0.887)
Profitability (%) 0.000∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.332) (0.000)
Log(1+sales) −0.094 −0.097 −0.082
(0.288) (0.483) (0.437)
Log(1+age) −0.445∗∗∗ −0.555∗∗∗ −0.273∗∗
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006)
Log(1+nbr of empl.) 0.274∗ 0.258 0.111
(0.012) (0.145) (0.388)
Constant −2.125∗ −1.900 −3.744∗∗
(0.026) (0.196) (0.002)
Controls Yes
Observations 26, 719 9, 134 13, 254
Events 230 88 211
p-values in parentheses
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
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